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NO LONGER INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY:
HOW OHIO VIOLATES THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT THROUGH FAMILIAL DNA
SEARCHES OF FELONY ARRESTEES
JORDAN MASON*
ABSTRACT
In 2013, the United States Supreme Court legalized DNA collection of all felony
arrestees upon arrest through its decision in Maryland v. King. Since then, the State of
Ohio has broadened the use of arrestee DNA by subjecting it to familial DNA
searches. Ohio’s practice of conducting familial DNA searches of arrestee DNA
violates the Fourth Amendment because arrestees have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information that is extracted from a familial DNA search and it fails
both the totality of the circumstances and the special needs tests. Further, these tests
go against the intention of the Supreme Court when it legalized arrestee DNA
collection as it specifically precluded the use of arrestee DNA collection in its
Maryland v. King decision.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In August of 2017, Leon Edwards was arrested for attempted murder, felonious
assault, and other charges stemming from a road-rage inspired shooting in Cleveland,
Ohio.1 After a year of incarceration,2 Edwards finally was able to take his case to trial.3
At the close of the evidence, the jury deliberated for less than three hours before
returning with not guilty verdicts, acquitting Edwards of all charges.4 Although
Edwards was found not guilty, it is likely he was unaware that his DNA would remain
in the State’s possession and that it would be used to subject him and his blood
relatives to searches of future criminal activity.
This is because Ohio is one of twelve states in the country to conduct familial DNA
searches.5 A familial DNA search occurs when law enforcement officers obtain a
DNA sample from an arrestee upon booking and use that sample to create a DNA

1 Corey Shaffer, Trial in Road-Rage Shooting of Child Nearly Derailed After Co-Defendant
Reneges
on
Plea
Deal
and
Refuses
to
Testify,
CLEVELAND.COM,
https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2018/08/trial_in_road-rage_shooting_of_1.html (last
updated Jan. 30, 2019).
2 Corey Shaffer, Cleveland Man Found Not Guilty in Road-Rage Shooting of Child,
https://www.cleveland.com/courtCLEVELAND.COM,
justice/2018/08/cleveland_man_found_not_guilty_1.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2019).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Allison Murray et al., Familial DNA Testing: Current Practices and Recommendations for
Implementation, 9 INVESTIGATIVE SCI. J. 1, 1 (2017).
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profile of the individual in one of the State’s DNA databases.6 After creating the DNA
profile, law enforcement agencies are able to compare that profile with DNA evidence
left at a crime scene.7 If the crime scene evidence does not respond with a direct “hit”
to a DNA profile already in the database, officers are able to run another search of the
system looking for profiles that partially match the crime scene DNA.8 A profile that
results from this search is not the true suspect of the crime because the profile does
not completely match the sample.9 However, the profile may inform law enforcement
officers that the true suspect of the crime is someone who shares DNA with the person
who has the DNA profile – a family member.10
In 2016, the Ohio Attorney General implemented familial DNA searching in
criminal investigations by producing a twelve-page protocol outlining the State’s
procedure for conducting such searches.11 The protocol outlines that the database is
used for cases which are “[v]iolent, causing serious injury or death; or which
demonstrate a continuing threat of imminent and serious harm to one or more members
of the community; and [n]ot solvable by traditional methods of criminal
investigation.”12 The protocol also provides that searches are conducted on DNA
profiles that are currently located in Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), which
is the country’s national DNA database.13 Additionally, familial searches are strictly
performed on males because the tests can only be performed on the Y chromosome,14
which is located solely in the male body.15
Ohio’s CODIS DNA databank includes DNA profiles from individuals who have
been arrested for a crime that they have not yet, if ever, been proven guilty of
committing. After there has been an arrest of an individual suspected of committing a
felony, the State takes a DNA sample from the felony arrestee and uses that sample to
create a profile of them.16 Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.07(a) authorizes the

6 Sara Debus-Sherrill & Michael B. Field, Understanding Familial DNA Searching, NAT’L
CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., Aug. 2017, at 2, 3.
7 Id. at 2.
8 Id. at 3.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 OHIO BUREAU OF CRIM. INVESTIGATION CRIME LAB., FAMILIAL SEARCH POLICY
PROCEDURES (2016) [hereinafter BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH].

AND

12 Id. at 3.
13 Id. at 3–4.
14 Id. at 2.
15 Y Chromosome, MEDLINEPLUS (Aug. 17, 2020), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/chromosome/Y.
16 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(a) (2020); CODIS Unit, OHIO ATT’Y GEN.,
https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Law-Enforcement/Bureau-of-CriminalInvestigation/Laboratory-Division/CODIS-Unit (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
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aforementioned use of arrestee DNA.17 Although the constitutionality of felony
arrestee DNA statutes similar to Ohio’s have been challenged, the United States
Supreme Court has upheld the practice.18 No court within the United States, however,
has ruled on the constitutionality of subjecting an arrestee’s DNA to an additional
familial DNA search.
The concerns with conducting familial DNA searches of arrestee DNA are
heightened when looking at Ohio’s DNA expungement procedure. The process is
ambiguous, leaving it unclear whether or not felony-arrestee DNA is ever removed
from CODIS after the arrestee has been acquitted from charges. However, even if Ohio
does expunge an individual’s DNA after non-conviction, the burden to initiate the
process is placed on the individual, and the law provides no time frame within which
the State must remove the DNA profile from CODIS. Consequently, Ohio law allows
for former arrestees’ DNA to remain in CODIS for an indefinite time, even if they
have been acquitted of the criminal charges.
This Note argues that Ohio’s use of an arrestee’s DNA in a CODIS familial DNA
search is unconstitutional for the following reasons: arrestees have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against familial DNA searches, the searches violate the Fourth
Amendment under both the totality of the circumstances and special needs test, the
United States Supreme Court specifically precluded familial DNA searches when it
legalized arrestee DNA collection statutes, and Ohio’s DNA expungement process
provides a possibility that individuals may be subject to limitless searches for their
entire lives. Part II gives scientific background of DNA, and the history of challenges
to arrestee DNA collection statutes. Part II.A provides a background of the evolution
of the use of DNA in criminal investigations. Part II.B discusses Fourth Amendment
challenges to arrestee DNA collection statutes and the current state of the law. Part III
explains why Ohio’s use of arrestee DNA in familial searches is unconstitutional. Part
III.A discusses how a familial DNA search creates an unlawful search that violates the
Fourth Amendment under both the totality of the circumstances test and the special
needs doctrine. Part III.B details how the United States Supreme Court did not intend
for arrestee DNA to be used in familial DNA searches when it upheld the
constitutionality of arrestee DNA collection statutes. Part III.C analyzes Ohio’s
current DNA expungement process and explains how it allows the state to continue
conducting unconstitutional searches even after an individual has been formally
acquitted. Finally, Part IV concludes that familial DNA searches of arrestee DNA are
unlawful searches under the Fourth Amendment and emphasizes why Ohio must
refrain from conducting these searches.
II. BACKGROUND OF FAMILIAL DNA AND ARRESTEE DNA COLLECTION
STATUTES
To best understand why Ohio’s practice of familial DNA searches of arrestee DNA
is a violation of the Fourth Amendment, background information on the evolution of
DNA in criminal investigations is helpful. This includes an introduction to the first
use of DNA in criminal investigations, an overview of how the CODIS databank
works, and how the use of DNA is expanding to familial searches. Equally important

17 § 2901.07(a).
18 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 439 (2013).
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is an understanding of a Fourth Amendment analysis and the two main cases that have
upheld the constitutionality of arrestee DNA collection statutes.
A. Evolution of DNA in Criminal Investigations
Since the introduction of DNA phenotyping in 1984,19 DNA has become a vital
part of forensic investigations,20 and the use of DNA has rapidly expanded in forensic
science all over the world.21 With the expansion came an increase in the scope of DNA
collection.22 The first authorization of DNA collection came from Congress through
the passage of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (“The DNA
Act”).23 The DNA Act requires law enforcement to obtain DNA from “each individual
in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying
Federal offense” and “an individual on probation, parole, or supervised release.”24 In
2009, the scope of the DNA Act dramatically changed when it was amended to require
law enforcement to obtain DNA samples from all individuals who are arrested, facing
charges, or facing convictions.25
Two years after the federal law was amended, Ohio also broadened its scope of
DNA collection by requiring DNA collection from arrestees with the passage of §
2901.07(B)(1)(a) of the Ohio Revised Code.26 Section 2901.07(B)(1)(a) provides: “On
and after July 1, 2011, a person who is eighteen years of age or older and who is
arrested on or after July 1, 2011, for a felony offense shall submit to a DNA specimen
collection procedure administered by the head of the arresting law enforcement
agency.”27 After an arrestee’s DNA is collected, the DNA is used to create a profile of
the individual.28 The DNA profile is then shared with the Bureau of Criminal
Identification and Investigation and added to Ohio’s state DNA database.29

19 Susan Matheson, DNA Phenotyping: Snapshot of a Criminal, 166 CELL 1061, 1061 (2016).
20 Walther Parson, Age Estimation with DNA: From Forensic DNA Fingerprinting to
Forensic (Epi) Genomics: A Mini-Review, 64 GERONTOLOGY 326, 327 (2018).
21 Id. at 327–28.
22 Id.
23 See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3(a), 114
Stat. 2726, 2728 (2000) (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 40701).
24 Id.
25 28 C.F.R. § 28.12(b) (2020).
26 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1)(a) (2020).
27 Id.
28 See CODIS Unit, supra note 16.
29 Id.
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Ohio continued to expand its use of DNA in late 2016,30 when it became one of
eleven states to implement familial DNA searches in criminal investigations.31 The
Ohio Attorney General’s Office and the Ohio BCI Crime Laboratory laid out its
familial search policy and procedures in a twelve-page protocol.32 Shortly thereafter,
the state began conducting familial DNA searches and successfully arrested its first
suspect.33 Although familial searches can result in a successful criminal prosecution,34
they also present grave privacy concerns for arrestees and their blood relatives. An
understanding of these concerns requires an overview of DNA analysis and its use in
criminal investigations, along with an understanding of the CODIS Database.
1.

Introduction of DNA to Criminal Investigations

Every cell in the human body contains DNA.35 DNA is found within twenty-three
pairs of chromosomes.36 One pair determines the person’s sex, while the remaining
twenty-two autosomal chromosomes are used to ascertain human identity.37 On each
chromosome one strand is contributed from the mother, while the other strand comes
from the father.38
The DNA material inside of the chromosomes contain both coding and non-coding
regions.39 The coding regions are referred to as genes and contain the necessary
information for protein creation.40 Genes make up approximately five percent of the
human genome.41 The rest of the chromosomal material is made up of non-coding
regions of DNA.42 These are referred to as junk DNA.43 Junk DNA houses the genetic
information which is used to establish identity because it contains genetic markers
30 See BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11.
31 Murray et al., supra note 5, at 3.
32 See generally BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11.
33 Vicki Anderson-Gregg, Arrest Made in Westside Abduction Case, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION CLEVELAND (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/fieldoffices/cleveland/news/press-releases/arrest-made-in-westside-abduction-case.
34 Id.
35 JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR
MARKERS 22 (2d ed. 2005).
36 Id. at 20.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 23.
39 Id. at 22.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss1/10

6

2020]

NO LONGER INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY

191

which vary amongst individuals.44 The position of a gene or a DNA marker in the noncoding junk DNA region is called a locus.45 Each locus has a genetic sequence that
contains variable repeats of short sequences of base pairs which are referred to as
STRs.46 Forensic scientists examine twenty core loci47 to establish identity and look
for disparity amongst STRs at all twenty markers.48 The disparity amongst the number
of sequences at every marker establishes a distinctive profile,49 allowing for
identification of a certain individual.50 STR patterns are “highly variable among
individuals,” resulting in a minimal chance that they are shared by multiple people.51
During a criminal investigation, investigators obtain a genetic sample from blood,
hair, skin, or other biological matter that was recovered from a crime scene and
compare it to an existing DNA sample.52 A small number of genetic markers are
identified on the sample by using manufactured chemical sequences, known as
primers, that attach to similar DNA sequences of interest in the sample.53 A string of
primers joined to the DNA enlarges the original specimen and enables a forensic
scientist to ascertain if a DNA profile exists.54 Forensic scientists then compare the
length of loci from two different DNA samples, and if the lengths match at enough
points along the chain a genetic match exists, identifying a suspect.55

44 Id.
45 Id. at 22–23.
46 Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 248, 249 (2006).
47 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
(last visited Feb. 17, 2019).
48 BUTLER, supra note 35, at 116.
49 Matheson, supra note 19, at 1061.
50 Id.
51 BUTLER, supra note 35, at 85.
52 Id. at 34 tbl.3.1 (listing some of the sources of biological materials used for PCR-based
DNA typing).
53 Id. at 65.
54 Samuel Hodge, Current Controversies in the Use of DNA in Forensic Investigations, 48
UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 39, 42 (2018).
55 Karen Norrgard, Forensics, DNA Fingerprinting, and CODIS, SCITABLE (2008),
https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/forensics-dna-fingerprinting-and-codis-736/.
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CODIS Databank

Investigators keep DNA profiles of individuals and use them as reference samples
to crime scene DNA profiles.56 In order to effectively maintain DNA profiles, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation created the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”)
national database.57 The term CODIS refers to both the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s program for criminal DNA databases and the software that is used to
manage the databases.58 Currently, all states and the federal government use CODIS
for the storage of DNA profiles.59 CODIS allows federal, state, and local law
enforcement to identify potential suspects by matching DNA profiles from crime
scene evidence to convicted offender and arrestee profiles.60 As of September 2020,
the national database contained over 14,328,685 offender profiles, 4,117,039 arrestee
profiles, and 1,055,090 forensic profiles.61
CODIS is comprised of local, state, and national databases.62 The Local DNA
Index System (“LDIS”) is installed in police departments, sheriff’s offices, and state
agencies, and the database can be entered to search against other profiles from local
cases.63 All forensic DNA records originate at the local level and then flow into the
state and national levels.64 Each state has a single laboratory that operates a State DNA
Index System (“SDIS”), which compares DNA profiles within the state.65 SDIS is
traditionally run by the agency that maintains the state’s convicted offender DNA
database program.66 Each state also has its own statute(s) which regulate the types of
samples that are submitted to the database.67 The National Data Index System
(“NDIS”) is the top level of CODIS and contains all DNA records submitted by
56 Derek Regensburger, DNA Databases and the Fourth Amendment: The Time Has Come
to Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant Requirement and the Primary
Purpose Test, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 319, 321 (2009).
57 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61
CODIS-NDIS
Statistics,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited
Oct. 22, 2020).
62 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
63 See OHIO BUREAU OF CRIM. INVESTIGATION CRIME LAB., OHIO CODIS OPERATING
PROCEDURES 4 (2018) [hereinafter OHIO CODIS OPERATING PROCEDURES].
64 CODIS Brochure, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 1, https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/combined-dna-index-system-codis-brochure.pdf/view (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
65 See OHIO CODIS OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at 4.
66 Id.
67 See Debus-Sherrill & Field, supra note 6, at 3.
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participating federal, state, and local forensic laboratories.68 This system requires the
determination of twenty core loci,69 which ensures uniformity amongst the states
because they all use the same terminology and collect profiles that are comparable to
assist in DNA matching.70
Three levels of stringency searches can be performed within CODIS.71 A high
stringency search requires all alleles on the twenty core loci to match between the two
DNA profiles,72 resulting in exact identification of an individual.73 A moderate
stringency test is run when crime scene evidence contains less than the twenty core
loci because it is partially degraded or contains DNA from more than one individual.74
This type of search requires all alleles to match, but allows the profiles to contain a
different number of alleles.75 A low stringency search requires a direct match of at
least one of the alleles, even though the profiles also contain alleles that do not match.76
Most CODIS searches are run at high or moderate stringency levels;77 however, low
stringency searches are increasing as more states implement familial DNA searches.
3.

Expansion of DNA Collection to Familial DNA Searches

As previously stated, eleven states have expanded their use of CODIS by
implementing familial searches.78 While states have slowly adopted these searches
over the past decade, the United Kingdom was the first country to conduct a familial
DNA search and subsequently use that information for prosecution.79 Other countries,
such as New Zealand and the Netherlands, also perform familial DNA searches.80

68 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
69 Id.
70 See CODIS Brochure, supra note 64, at 2.
71 Eva Steinberger & Gary Sims, Finding Criminals Through the DNA of Their Relatives—
Familial Searching of the California Offender DNA Database, 31 PROSECUTOR’S BRIEF 28, 30
(2008).
72 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
73 Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV.
291, 297 (2010).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Murray et al., supra note 5, at 3.
79 Debus-Sherrill & Field, supra note 6, at 4–5.
80 Id. at 5.
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Familial DNA searches are often confused with partial matches.81 Partial matches
result from routine searches of the NDIS database and are defined by the FBI as “a
moderate stringency candidate match between two single source profiles having at
each locus all the alleles of one sample represented in the other sample.”82 Partial
matches are not suspects of the crime because some of the alleles do not match that of
the crime scene sample.83 Instead of being used to identify a suspect, that profile then
becomes a pivot.84 A pivot directs law enforcement to possible suspects who share a
similar DNA profile with the pivot, such as a family member.85 This is because people
who are related have more commonalities in their genetic profiles than individuals
who are unrelated to them.86
Although partial matches and familial DNA searches are similar, a familial DNA
search is defined as “an intentional or deliberate search of the database conducted after
a routine search for the propose of potentially identifying close biological relatives of
the unknown forensic sample associated with the crime scene profile.”87 The process
for conducting a familial DNA search is relatively the same as a partial match, as both
are conducted through moderate to low stringency tests and result in pivot profiles of
the true suspect.88 The main difference is that familial searches are limited to male
profiles because the tests can only look at STRs on the Y chromosome,89 which is
located solely in the male body.90 Additionally, familial DNA searches are deliberate

81 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Erica Haimes, Social and Ethical Issues in the Use of Familial Searching in Forensic
Investigations: Insights from Family and Kinship Studies, 34 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 263, 269
(2006).
85 Id.
86 Murray et al., supra note 5, at 2.
87 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
88 See Murphy, supra note 73, at 296–98.
89 BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11, at 2; Philip Ritter, The Y-Chromosome and Genetic
UNIV.
(2005),
Genealogy,
STANFORD
https://web.stanford.edu/~philr/Bachman/DNABachman3.html (observing that the Ychromosome is seen as more reliable because “[m]ost chromosomes, including the two xchromosomes possessed by females, get recombined or shuffled each generation before being
passed down to offspring. But the y-chromosome is unique in remaining more or less unchanged
when passed from father to son. Thus while most chromosomes will contain a random mixture
of genetic codes from one’s grandparents and great-grandparents, a male’s y-chromosome will
be identical or nearly identical to that of his father, grandfather, great-grandfather and beyond
for countless generations.”).
90 Y Chromosome, MEDLINEPLUS (Aug. 17, 2020), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/chromosome/Y;
EMILY NIEDZWIECKI ET AL., NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., UNDERSTANDING FAMILIAL
DNA SEARCHING: COMING TO A CONSENSUS ON TERMINOLOGY 4 (2017) (“Y-STR testing
compares alleles located on the Y-chromosome that are identical among all paternally related
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searches for relatives, while partial matches result from routine searches of the
database.91 Lastly, familial searches are not conducted at the federal level or through
the National DNA Index System.92 Instead, they are only performed by states that
authorize familial searches, and are conducted through state and local DNA Index
Systems.93
B. Fourth Amendment Challenges to DNA Collection of Arrestees
The collection of felony-arrestee DNA under the Federal DNA Act has withstood
constitutional challenges under the Fourth Amendment in Circuit Courts and the
United States Supreme Court.94 No United States court has reviewed the privacy
implications involved in familial searches of felony-arrestee DNA. When the Ohio
Supreme Court reviews this issue as a case of first impression, it will likely find that
the privacy concerns implicated in Ohio’s familial searches of arrestee DNA outweigh
the governmental interest in performing the searches and violates the Fourth
Amendment.
1.

Fourth Amendment Analysis

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people from
unreasonable searches and seizures.95 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.96
The United States Supreme Court best articulated the protections guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment through Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United
States.97 Justice Harlan stated that the Fourth Amendment extends to circumstances in
which individuals have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”98 The two-part test to
determine reasonableness is whether the individual has a subjective expectation of

males but highly varied among the larger population. Y-STR testing can only be used with male
samples (as the Y-chromosome is specific to male DNA) but it is highly reliable as the mutation
rate of the alleles is very low.”).
91 NIEDZWIECKI ET AL., supra note 90, at 7.
92 Id. at 2.
93 Id. at 5–6.
94 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 439 (2013); see United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,
389 (3d Cir. 2011).
95 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96 Id.
97 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
98 Id.
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privacy and whether the expectation is recognized as objectively reasonable by
society.99 Article I, section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provides generally the same
language as the Fourth Amendment.100 The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that
Article I, section 14 provides no other protections than that of the Fourth
Amendment.101
Prior to Congress’s amendment to the DNA Act, every circuit court that considered
the constitutionality of a DNA indexing statute upheld the statute under the Fourth
Amendment.102 However, subsequent to the passage of the Act, the circuits are divided
on the proper test to apply when considering whether DNA indexing is a search under
the Fourth Amendment.103 The Second and Seventh Circuits apply the special needs
doctrine,104 while the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits apply a totality of the circumstances test.105
Under the special needs doctrine, the Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless
search without suspicion is justified “when special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”106
While a “general interest in crime control” is not enough, “some special law
enforcement concerns” are justified when “the concept of individualized suspicion has
little role to play.”107 When a special need is identified, reasonableness must be
evaluated, balancing the gravity of the public interests, the degree to which the
intrusion advances the public interests, and the severity of the interference with

99 Id. at 361.
100 The Ohio text reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the person and
things to be seized.
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101 State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766–67 (Ohio 1997).
102 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 402 (3d Cir. 2011).
103 Id. at 402–03.
104 See United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Hook,
471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2006); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677–78 (7th Cir. 2004).
105 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 403; see United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007);
United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,
308 (4th Cir. 1992); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004); Wilson
v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924–25
(8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 2007); Padgett v. Donald,
401 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
106 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 351 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
107 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004).
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individual liberty.108 The special needs test is the more stringent of the two tests
because it requires the court to identify “some special need beyond the normal need
for law enforcement.”109
Under the totality of the circumstances test, the Supreme Court described that a
reasonable search is determined “by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”110 The first prong in
analyzing reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances test is evaluating the
degree of intrusion that the search has on an individual’s privacy.111 The second prong
is to assess “the degree to which [the search] is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.112
2.

United States v. Mitchell: One of the First Cases to Conduct a Fourth
Amendment Analysis of Arrestee DNA Collection

In 2011, the Third Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of collecting DNA
samples from felony-arrestees under the Fourth Amendment in United States v.
Mitchell.113 To determine whether Mitchell, a felony-arrestee, had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the court applied a totality of the circumstances test and
determined that DNA collection entails two separate searches.114 The first search
occurs when law enforcement physically collects a DNA sample from the felonyarrestee.115 However, the court relied on prior precedent finding that this is not a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment by stating:
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the “intrusion occasioned by a
blood test is not significant, since such ‘tests are a commonplace in these
days of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that
the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the
procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”116
In light of the precedent on this issue, the court determined that the act of collecting
a DNA sample was “neither a significant nor an unusual intrusion,”117 and the

108 Wilson, 571 F.3d at 426 (citing Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426–27).
109 Amerson, 483 F.3d at 80.
110 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19, 122 (2001) (citing Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
111 Id. at 118–19 (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300).
112 Id. at 119.
113 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 2011).
114 Id. at 406.
115 Id.
116 Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
117 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007).
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intrusion of collecting a DNA sample did not significantly weigh in Mitchell’s
favor.118
The second search at issue occurs when law enforcement processes the DNA
sample and creates a DNA profile in CODIS.119 The court determined that arrestees
possess “a diminished expectation of privacy in their own identity, which has
traditionally justified taking their fingerprints and photographs.”120 Thus, “because
DNA profiles developed pursuant to the DNA Act function as ‘genetic fingerprints’
used only for identification purposes, arrestees and pretrial detainees have reduced
privacy interests in the information derived from a DNA sample.”121 Further, the court
distinguished between a DNA sample and a DNA profile by stating that DNA samples
contain information regarding familial lineage and genetic conditions while DNA
profiles uploaded into CODIS only reveal identity, in which arrestees have a
diminished expectation of privacy.122
When assessing the government’s interest, the court found that DNA collection
furthers the government’s interest in accurately identifying arrestees and pretrial
detainees, which would be lost if the government waited until conviction to take a
DNA sample.123 After weighing the interests of the government and the arrestee, the
court concluded that “under the totality of the circumstances, given arrestees’ and
pretrial detainees’ diminished expectations of privacy in their identities and the
Government’s legitimate interests in the collection of DNA from these individuals”
the collection is reasonable and not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.124
3.

Maryland v. King: The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
Assessment of Arrestee DNA Collection

In 2013, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of
Maryland’s DNA Collection Act in Maryland v. King.125 The statute required that law
enforcement collect the DNA of felony-arrestees, but specifically precluded use of
arrestee DNA in familial DNA searches.126 In applying the totality of the
circumstances test, the Court afforded great weight to both the significant government

118 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 412.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 412–13 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 608 (W.D. Pa.
2009)).
123 Id. at 414.
124 Id. at 416.
125 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 439 (2013).
126 Id. at 443–44; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (2009) (“A person may not
perform a search of the statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an offender
in connection with a crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of the individual
from whom the DNA sample was acquired.”).
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interest at stake in the identification of arrestees and the unmatched potential of DNA
identification to serve that interest.127 The Supreme Court agreed with the Third
Circuit’s analysis in Mitchell and found that the governmental interest in identification
of arrestees outweighs the arrestee’s diminished sense of personal privacy.128 Ohio
courts have never specifically ruled on this issue, but the Ohio Supreme Court has
cited to King accepting it as precedent.129
As some of the first cases upholding arrestee DNA collection statutes,130 the
precedent set in Mitchell and King must be consulted when addressing expansions to
arrestee DNA collection laws. King sets important limitations on the uses of arrestee
DNA that are being ignored by the State of Ohio in familial DNA searches,131 while
Mitchell operated under a misunderstanding of the vast amount of information that
can be gathered from an arrestee’s DNA profile.132 Application of these cases, along
with a Fourth Amendment analysis under both the special needs and totality of the
circumstances tests, demonstrate how Ohio’s inclusion of arrestee DNA in familial
DNA searches is too expansive and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
III. WHY FAMILIAL SEARCHES OF ARRESTEE DNA PROFILES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although familial DNA searches are not conducted at the national level nor are
they performed by the national DNA index System,133 they are performed by the state
of Ohio through the State DNA index System.134 Ohio has provided a protocol
outlining how arrestee DNA searches are conducted, and although the protocol lists

127 King, 569 U.S. at 461.
128 Id. at 464–65.
129 State v. Banks-Harvey, 96 N.E.3d 262, 275 (Ohio 2018).
130 See Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that DNA analysis
was effective to identify arrestees, solve past crimes, and exonerate innocent suspects, so
government’s compelling interests outweighed arrestee’s privacy concerns; thus no Fourth
Amendment violation in collecting arrestees’ DNA samples and no likelihood of success on
challenge of the 2004 Amendment to California’s DNA Act); see also People v. Buza, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the
requirement under the DNA Act that a felony arrestee submit a DNA sample for law
enforcement analysis and inclusion in DNA databases, without independent suspicion, a
warrant, or even a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause).
131 King, 569 U.S. 435, 444 (2013) (“Tests for familial matches are also prohibited.”).
132 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 409 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that CODIS is
not designed for intentional familial searches and that such searches do not produce any useful
information).
133 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
134 See BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11.
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certain limitations in conducting familial DNA searches, none of the limitations
address whether a familial DNA search can be conducted of an arrestee’s DNA.135
As previously noted, circuit courts have conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis
of the DNA Act allowing for the collection of an arrestee’s DNA and the subsequent
creation of a DNA profile in CODIS.136 The Ohio Supreme Court has not individually
reviewed the constitutionality of its version of the DNA Act, § 2901.07(a) of the Ohio
Revised Code. However, the Ohio Supreme Court has cited to Maryland v. King in
other opinions, which confirms that Ohio follows the precedent established by the
United States Supreme Court.137 No court in the United States has reviewed the
constitutionality of a familial DNA search. Thus, no court has had the opportunity to
review the more specific topic of whether a familial DNA search of arrestee DNA is
a search under the Fourth Amendment. Upon a review of this issue, the Ohio Supreme
Court should find that the use of an arrestee’s DNA in a familial search is
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because familial DNA searches fail
both the totality of the circumstances and the special needs tests applied by various
circuits. Moreover, it can be argued that the United States Supreme Court has
precluded familial searches from arrestee DNA collection.
A. Familial DNA Searches Conduct a Third Unlawful Search That Violates
the Fourth Amendment
Courts that have conducted a Fourth Amendment analysis of arrestee DNA statutes
have approached DNA collection as a two-part search.138 A search under the Fourth
Amendment occurs when a governmental employee or agent of the government
violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.139 Although the Court has
not definitively outlined which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection, the
intention of the framers when creating the Fourth Amendment was “to place obstacles
in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.”140 In a familial DNA search, the
first search involves a physical bodily invasion and is administered by taking a buccal
swab from the arrestee. Courts have held that invasions similar to buccal swabs are
searches that implicate the Fourth Amendment.141 Buccal swabs, however, do not
reveal personal information about an individual unless it is entered into CODIS or a
135 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(B)(1)(a) (2020); BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11,
at 3.
136 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 402.
137 State v. Banks-Harvey, 96 N.E.3d 262, 275 (Ohio 2018).
138 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406.
139 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
140 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (citing United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
141 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013); State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1132
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“Courts
have routinely held that the collection of DNA by means of a blood test is a minimal intrusion
into an individual’s privacy interest in bodily integrity while collection by means of a buccal
swab is even less intrusive.”) (internal citations omitted); Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407.
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searchable database.142 This leads to the second search, which is the creation of a DNA
profile in CODIS and the comparison of that profile to other profiles.143 The second
search is what has been focused on by courts and has generally withstood
constitutional review.144
This Note asserts that Ohio’s practice of conducting a familial search of an
arrestee’s DNA profile creates a third “search” that must be reviewed under a Fourth
Amendment analysis. In assessing the constitutionality of a familial search of an
arrestee’s DNA under a Fourth Amendment analysis, it is clear that an arrestee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her familial DNA. Applying either the
totality of the circumstances or special needs test confirms that the individual interest
of the arrestee outweighs the governmental interest in conducting the search.
1.

Arrestees Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Familial DNA

A search under the Fourth Amendment occurs when the government violates an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.145 In Justice Harlan’s Katz concurring
opinion, he explained that to determine whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”146 The Court clarified in
California v. Ciraolo that “[t]he second question under Katz has been described as
asking whether an expectation of privacy is ‘legitimate in the sense required by the
Fourth Amendment.’”147 There, Justice Powell observed in a footnote that “[s]ince
Katz, our decisions also have described constitutionally protected privacy interests as
those that society regards as ‘legitimate,’ using the words ‘reasonable’ and ‘legitimate’
interchangeably.”148 Although the dissent would have applied a higher standard here,
this proposition is not inconsistent with the Court’s decision.149 Here, arrestees do have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that is extracted from their DNA
profiles during a familial DNA search because they meet both prongs of the
reasonableness test.
In State v. Emerson, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA profile that was obtained from the
142 Brendan Heil, Striking a Balance: Why Ohio’s Felony Arrestee Statute is
Unconstitutional and Ripe for Legislative Action, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 529, 554 (2013).
143 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760 (“The latter search is the true focus of our analysis and the
analyses of other courts that have considered the validity of DNA statutes.”).
144 King, 569 U.S. at 465; Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416.
145 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
146 Id.
147 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984)).
148 Id. at 219 n.4.
149 See id. at 212 (majority opinion) (using “legitimacy” and “reasonableness”
interchangeably in the prong two analysis).
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individual’s DNA sample.150 The court recognized that an individual has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his or her own bodily fluids, which extends to DNA samples
taken from arrestees.151 However, the court found that when a DNA sample is obtained
lawfully by warrant or statute, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a DNA profile created from the sample.152 Thus, an individual lacks
standing to object to its use by the State in a subsequent criminal investigation.153
In coming to its conclusion, the court attempted to apply the two prong reasonable
expectation of privacy test.154 In assessing the individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy, it appears that the court misapplied the subjective test and instead sought to
determine whether the individual possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
DNA profile,155 which is assessed under the reasonableness prong of the Katz test.156
Instead, the court should have applied the correct test, which is whether the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search.157 By failing to look at the individual’s subjective manifestation of privacy, the
court failed to perform the first prong of the test.
While mistaking it as part of the subjective test, the court did assess the objective
prong of the test by determining whether the individual’s expectation of privacy is
legitimate.158 The court found that an individual does not have a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his DNA profile because after a DNA sample is collected from an
individual, a government official must perform a “scientific process” on the sample to
obtain the DNA profile.159 According to the court, because the “scientific process” is
performed by a government official, the DNA profile is a work product of the
government, and individuals have no possessory ownership interest in their own DNA
profile.160 Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court has held:
[A] defendant [can] not plausibly assert any expectation of privacy with
respect to the scientific analysis of a lawfully seized item of tangible
property, such as a gun or a controlled substance. Although, human blood,
with its unique genetic properties, may initially be quantitatively different
from such evidence, once constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a blood
150 Emerson v. State, 981 N.E.2d 787, 790 (Ohio 2012).
151 Id. at 791.
152 Id. at 792.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 791–93.
155 Id. at 791–92.
156 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 211 (majority opinion).
158 Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 791.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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sample is not unlike other tangible property which can be subject to a battery
of scientific tests.161
Focusing on the current issue of familial DNA searches of arrestee DNA, Emerson
can be distinguished as it focuses on an arrestee’s expectation of privacy in the
physical DNA sample itself rather than the information that is extracted from the
sample.162 Here, the question is whether an arrestee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information that is extracted from his DNA profile during a familial
DNA search.
An arrestee has a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
that is obtained from his DNA profile during a familial DNA search. Familial searches
reveal private information about male genetically related family members,163 which
may not be available to law enforcement without the arrestee’s DNA sample. This
information is personal to the arrestee because it reveals information about family
relationships and possible relationships unknown to the arrestee. Because there is a
large amount of personal information that can be obtained from an arrestee’s DNA
profile during a familial DNA search, it is likely that he has a subjective expectation
of privacy against government intrusion in this information and is not knowingly
exposing it to the public, thus, satisfying the first prong of the reasonableness test.
It can also be determined that an arrestee’s expectation of privacy is legitimate and
reasonable. When assessing whether the expectation of privacy is legitimate, the Ohio
Supreme Court’s analysis in Emerson is distinguishable. Although the court in
Emerson is correct in finding that the State must perform its own scientific process on
an arrestee’s DNA sample, giving an arrestee no possessory interest in the DNA
profile itself,164 an arrestee does have an interest in the information that is extracted
from the profile during a familial DNA search. The physical DNA sample reveals no
personal information about the arrestee until it is analyzed against other DNA profiles
in CODIS.165 Thus, it is the information that is revealed through these comparisons in
which arrestees have a legitimate privacy interest. Familial DNA searches reveal
information about the arrestee’s relationships with their family,166 and although the
government may create the system in which the information is extracted, that does not
give it ownership of the private information. The information still belongs to the
arrestee as it pertains to his familial relationships. Because the arrestee does have
possessory interests over the information extracted from his DNA profile, his
expectation of privacy is legitimate.
Further, the court in Emerson associated DNA profiles to being like fingerprints
and blood samples which are “maintained on file by law enforcement authorities for

161 Id. at 792 (alteration in original) (citing Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1269 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
162 Id. at 791.
163 BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11, at 2.
164 Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 791.
165 Heil, supra note 142, at 554.
166 BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11, at 2.
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use in further investigations.”167 Here, unlike fingerprints and blood samples, familial
DNA searches do not readily identify one defendant and instead reveal information
about other individuals who do not have their own DNA profile in CODIS. The scope
of the information obtained in a familial DNA search goes beyond that of Emerson,
giving an arrestee a legitimate expectation of privacy. Thus, the second prong of the
reasonableness test has been met, giving an arrestee a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information extracted from his DNA profile.
2.

Application of the Totality of the Circumstances Test

Since an arrestee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that is
obtained from a familial DNA search, the next step in a Fourth Amendment analysis
is to determine if the search was reasonable. Reasonableness is the ultimate measure
of the constitutionality of a search or seizure, and all warrantless searches and seizures
are presumed to be unreasonable unless they fall within a limited exception.168
Warrantless collection of DNA samples fall within the probable cause exception to
the Fourth Amendment,169 and courts analyzing the reasonableness of the search do
so through an objective assessment considering the degree of intrusion by the search
and the manner in which the search was conducted.170
In conducting the assessment, a majority of courts apply the totality of the
circumstances test, which requires balancing an individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy against the degree to which the intrusion is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.171 Here, where an individual’s DNA is taken after
arrest, the DNA is used to create a DNA profile in CODIS, and that profile is used in
a familial search, the balancing test must be applied to each of the three steps as all
three implicate “searches” under the Fourth Amendment.
The first search is the bodily intrusion that occurs when an arrestee’s DNA is
physically taken.172 The primary way that a DNA sample is collected under Ohio’s
arrestee DNA statute is by collecting a buccal swab.173 The Ohio Supreme Court has
concluded that taking a buccal swab of the inner tissues of an individual’s cheek to
obtain DNA is a search,174 but has stated that the manner of taking DNA by a buccal
167 Emerson, 981 N.E.2d at 792–93 (citing Wilson v. State, 752 A.2d 1250, 1269 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Fourth Amendment, CORNELL LAW LEGAL INFORMATION
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last edited June 2017).

INSTITUTE,

169 Id.
170 Id.
171 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
172 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d Cir. 2011).
173 DNA Unit, OHIO ATT’Y GEN., https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/LawEnforcement/Bureau-of-Criminal-Investigation/Laboratory-Division/DNA-Unit (last visited
Dec. 3, 2019).
174 State v. Tench, 123 N.E.3d 955, 979 (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013)).
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swab is minimally intrusive.175 Additionally, the swab itself does not reveal private
information about an individual until it is uploaded into a DNA database.176 This Note
agrees with the findings of the majority of courts that the governmental interest in
collecting DNA swabs for potential evidentiary purposes plus the minimally intrusive
measure by which it is taken outweighs an individual’s privacy concerns.177 Thus, the
first search is reasonable.
The second search is the comparison of an arrestee’s DNA profile to other DNA
profiles in CODIS. In determining the reasonableness of this type of search, courts
weigh the promotion of legitimate governmental interests against the degree to which
the search intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.178 Many courts have held that
“probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a suspect and for a brief
period of detention to take administrative steps incident to arrest.”179 Courts have
determined that this probable cause determination, and the fact that arrestees must
submit to routine booking procedures results in a diminished expectation of privacy
for arrestees.180 In Maryland v. King, the U.S. Supreme Court established that the
legitimate government interest served by arrestee DNA collection is “the need for law
enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons
and possessions they must take into custody.”181 When balancing these two interests,
the Supreme Court in King found that the governmental interest outweighs the
diminished reasonable expectation of privacy of an arrestee who has not yet been
found guilty of a crime.182 Since the scale tips in favor of the governmental interest,
this search is reasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The third search occurs when an arrestee’s DNA profile is used in a familial DNA
search. Under Ohio Revised Code § 2901.07(b) and pursuant to the twelve-page
protocol released by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, Ohio is subjecting male
arrestees to this third unlawful search by implementing familial DNA searches in
criminal investigations. The guidelines set forth by the Ohio Attorney General
established that the State searches “[a] DNA profile that is currently in CODIS and
has been searched at NDIS and SDIS” and “the DNA profile must be associated with
a crime committed in Ohio.”183 This broad language confirms that there are no
limitations on the searches, and all DNA profiles that have been entered into Ohio’s

175 King, 569 U.S. at 446.
176 Heil, supra note 142, at 12.
177 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406–07; Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2007).
178 King, 569 U.S. at 436 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
179 Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975)).
180 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412.
181 King, 569 U.S. at 449.
182 See id. at 449–56.
183 BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11, at 4.
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CODIS database are subjected to familial DNA searches, including arrestees who have
not been proven guilty of criminal activity.
Although no court has applied a totality of the circumstances analysis to this type
of search yet, courts have indicated that this third search involves an invasion into an
arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy and outweighs the governmental
interest.184 This Note agrees with the presumptions made by these courts and finds that
the third search creates an intrusion into arrestees’ reasonable expectation of privacy
that substantially outweighs all governmental interests that have been put forth by
courts to support the constitutionality of the creation and comparison of arrestee DNA
profiles.
In King, the Supreme Court found that arrestee DNA collection was reasonable on
two major grounds. First, collecting an individual’s DNA upon arrest is similar to that
of collecting an arrestee’s fingerprint upon booking, which the Court found to be an
accurate way of identifying an arrestee.185 Second, the legitimate governmental
interest of “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process
and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody”186 outweighed
an arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy rights.187 Applying this holding to
Ohio’s third search of arrestee familial DNA testing demonstrates why the intrusion
into the arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy outweighs the governmental
interests supplied by the Supreme Court.
First, the Court stated that DNA collection is similar to that of fingerprinting.188
This is true when looking at DNA collection as a way of identifying an arrestee, but
when applying that theory to familial searches of arrestee DNA, the two are
incomparable. Familial searches of DNA go beyond mere identification and are used
to reveal personal information about the arrestee, such as his blood relatives.189 The
DNA sample is then used to implicate identified blood relatives in other crimes before
even solidifying a conviction for the arrestee.190 Contrarily, the information which is
provided from fingerprinting only identifies the arrestee; it does not identify any other
individuals.191 When subjecting an arrestee’s DNA sample to a familial search, the
information revealed goes beyond that of fingerprinting, creating a more intrusive
procedure into the arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, familial
DNA testing can reveal that a child was adopted, conceived via assisted conception
184 See King, 569 U.S. at 444 (prohibiting familial searches of arrestee DNA profiles).
185 Id. at 451.
186 Id. at 449.
187 Id. at 447.
188 Id. at 451.
189 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47.
190 See BCI FAMILIAL SEARCH, supra note 11, at 4 (performing familial searches on a DNA
profile currently in CODIS); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.07(a) (2020) (collecting DNA
samples from arrestees).
191 See King, 569 U.S. at 451 (comparing DNA profiles to the identification given by
fingerprints).
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by donation of a sperm or egg, or conceived through an adulterous relationship.192
Additionally, it can reveal other genetic relationships such that a child was born of
incest and may be both a sibling and a child of the mother.193 These revelations may
reveal highly personal and sensitive information that parents would not have disclosed
to their children, but against their will they will be revealed through a successful DNA
match.194
Second, the governmental interests provided in King relate to the arrestee himself,
and do not express a need for the government to include arrestees in a familial
search.195 The Court identified interests such as assurance that an arrestee will not
create risks for facility staff, the need to know the type of person being detained, the
governmental interest in ensuring all accused of crimes are available for trial, the need
to assess an arrestee’s danger to the public, and the possibility that correct
identification of an arrestee can free a person who is wrongfully imprisoned.196 These
interests demonstrate a clear focus on governmental interests involving the arrestee,
and provide no certainty as to whether or not they extend to the arrestee’s blood
relatives. The governmental interests are satisfied by a search of the arrestee’s DNA
in CODIS. Any subsequent familial searches that occur greatly exceed these interests.
Third, in his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the government’s means of
“identifying someone” is really “searching for evidence that he has committed crimes
unrelated to the crime of his arrest.”197 He continued by stating, “[i]f identifying
someone means finding out what unsolved crimes he has committed, then
identification is indistinguishable from the ordinary law-enforcement aims that have
never been thought to justify a suspicionless search.”198 Justice Scalia added that
“[s]earching every lawfully stopped car, for example, might turn up information about
unsolved crimes the driver had committed, but no one would say that such a search
was aimed at ‘identifying’ him, and no court would hold such a search lawful.”199
Justice Scalia’s thoughts of the government’s interest in “identifying” arrestees
created a further invasion into their reasonable expectation of privacy. By using an
arrestee’s DNA profiles in familial searches, the government is doing exactly what
Scalia described in his dissent.200 It appears that the only reason for including arrestee
DNA profiles in familial searches is to find potential leads in unsolved crimes by
broadening the number of searchable profiles in CODIS. No other legitimate
192 Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 309, 343 (2010).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 343–44.
195 King, 569 U.S. at 449–56.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
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governmental interest exists for including arrestees in the search other than the
possibility of revealing information about crimes in which the arrestee’s family
members may be implicated. Familial searches of arrestee DNA profiles illustrate
exactly what Justice Scalia feared in his dissent; the government is creating a DNA
profile of an arrestee’s DNA and using it to implicate an arrestee’s family members in
crimes unrelated to the crime for which the arrestee was charged. In no other context
would this search be considered lawful,201 and familial searches should no longer be
the exception.
Thus, when balancing an arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy against the
governmental interest in conducting arrestee familial DNA searches, the scale tips
heavily in favor of the arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the
Supreme Court determined that arrestees have a reduced expectation of privacy,202 that
expectation should not be imputed to their uninvolved family members as well. By
subjecting arrestees to familial DNA searches, the State of Ohio is using the Supreme
Court’s holding in King to bypass searches of the arrestee and expand it to their family
members as well. The use of arrestee DNA to conduct searches of blood relatives goes
well beyond the governmental interests cited in King, which were concerned with
mere identification and circumstances involving the arrestee.203 These governmental
interests are completely unrelated to familial DNA testing of arrestee DNA, resulting
in no legitimate governmental interest in conducting the searches. Familial DNA tests
of arrestee DNA are not aimed at the identification of the arrestee, and instead, are
completely unrelated to the crime of his arrest. This type of fishing expedition for
evidence is a substantial invasion into an arrestee’s reasonable expectation of privacy,
and it is not outweighed by the government’s purported legitimate reasons for
conducting the searches.
3.

Application of the Special Needs Doctrine

The special needs doctrine allows for warrantless searches and seizures without
individualized suspicion.204 Unlike the totality of the circumstances test, which allows
a court to balance an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against competing
government interests,205 the special needs doctrine requires a more stringent two-part
test.206 That is, whether the statute presents a valid special need and then a balancing
of whether the special need of the government exceeds the individual’s privacy
interest.207 Under this doctrine, “as long as a government interest exists beyond the
need to procure criminal convictions, governmental special needs can be enough to

201 Id.
202 Id. at 463 (majority opinion).
203 See id. at 449–56.
204 State v. Steele, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
205 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19, 122 (2001) (citing Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
206 Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1134.
207 Id.
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obviate the general requirement of probable cause or individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.”208 If there is a valid special need that is more than the “general interest
in crime control,”209 the court will balance the individual’s privacy interest with the
valid special need to determine whether the search is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.210
The special needs doctrine has been used in a few circuits to uphold DNA sampling
of convicted felons.211 Likewise, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the First District
applied the special needs doctrine in State v. Steel to determine the constitutionality of
a statute permitting the DNA collection of convicted offenders.212 The court found that
the statute was constitutional because the statute increased the accuracy of the criminal
justice system and solved future crimes.213 The court believed that both of these
purposes went beyond that of normal law enforcement, thus satisfying the special
needs test.214
However, the court in Steel is incorrect because the two purposes that the court
highlighted do not go beyond the normal duties of law enforcement. Protecting
communities and solving future crimes is exactly what police departments are
designed to do.215 The court’s holding was misplaced because it relied on two purposes
that do not go beyond the basic purposes of law enforcement.
Thus, when applying the special needs doctrine to Ohio’s third search of arrestee
DNA profiles in familial searches, courts should not give any weight to Steel. As
previously highlighted, the main purpose behind these searches is to increase the
amount of DNA profiles in CODIS so law enforcement can identify individuals
involved in unsolved crimes.216 No other legitimate purpose exists beyond general law
enforcement purposes and a general interest in crime control. Therefore, Ohio’s third
search of arrestee DNA profiles in familial searches is unconstitutional under the
special needs doctrine.
The unreasonable privacy invasions that occur through familial DNA searches of
arrestee DNA may result in an even greater invasion into the reasonable expectation
of privacy of the arrestee’s family members. Although it will not be specifically

208 Id.
209 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000).
210 Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1137; see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001);
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41–42.
211 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 2003); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678
(7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003).
212 Steele, 802 N.E.2d at 1137.
213 Id. at 1136.
214 Id.
215 Heil, supra note 142, at 541 (citing Police Department, LAKEWOOD, OHIO,
http://onelakewood.com/police/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) (using the Lakewood Police
Department’s mission statement to explain the goals of policing)).
216 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 473 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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addressed in this Note, the possibility of these greater implications is important to keep
in mind when reviewing a Fourth Amendment challenge to familial DNA searches of
arrestee DNA.
B. Cases Upholding Arrestee DNA Collection Specifically Precluded
Arrestee DNA from Familial DNA Searches
Courts that have upheld the constitutionality of arrestee DNA collection statutes
under the Fourth Amendment intended to exclude the potential for familial DNA
searches. First, the United States Supreme Court in its national authorization of
arrestee DNA collection in Maryland v. King did not intend for arrestee DNA to be
used in a familial search. In King, the Court analyzed the Maryland DNA Collection
Act which specifically precludes familial searches from arrestee DNA.217 The Court
based its holding, that the processing of an arrestee’s DNA sample in CODIS is
constitutional, on this fact. The Court stated that the Maryland DNA Collection Act is
constitutional because the loci does not reveal an “arrestee’s genetic traits and are
unlikely to reveal any private medical information. Even if they could provide such
information, they are not in fact tested for that end.”218 Although medical information
is different from the information that is gathered from a familial DNA search, familial
DNA searches reveal genetic relationships about an individual’s family members and
themselves that may not be the same as their social relationships.219 As previously
stated, familial DNA tests can reveal genetics unknown to the arrestee such as the fact
that they were adopted, they are a child of incest, or that they were conceived via
assisted conception.220 Thus, a familial search for an individual’s genetic traits
expressly goes beyond the Supreme Court’s holding in King.
Second, although the Court ruled on the Maryland DNA Collection Act, the Court
specifically stated that it was making a universal ruling on all arrestee DNA statutes
by stating that although the arrestee DNA laws are different in each state, “their
similarity means that this case implicates more than the specific Maryland law. At
issue is a standard, expanding technology already in widespread use throughout the
Nation.”221 Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court has not ruled on the
constitutionality of arrestee DNA collection and instead cites to Maryland v. King.222
Therefore, the Court’s reasoning behind the ruling in King applies to the State of Ohio.
Since Ohio follows King, Ohio is limited to the holding of the case which allows for
the creation of DNA profiles of arrestees but for the limited purpose of using it for
searches against other crime scene profiles that are already in CODIS. The use of an

217 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (2020) (“A person may not perform a search
of the statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an offender in connection
with a crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of the individual from whom
the DNA sample was acquired.”).
218 King, 569 U.S. at 438.
219 See supra notes 197–99.
220 See supra notes 197–99.
221 King, 569 U.S. at 445–46.
222 State v. Banks-Harvey, 96 N.E.3d 262, 275 (Ohio 2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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arrestee’s DNA profile in a familial search goes against this narrow holding and
expands DNA searching past the limits of constitutionality.
Third, King relies on the Third Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Mitchell, which
specifically excludes a familial DNA search from its analysis.223 In Mitchell, the
appellant distinguishes DNA collection from fingerprint collection by arguing that
“[u]nlike fingerprints, DNA can be used to investigate biological relationships
between individuals.”224 The court responded to that argument in a footnote by stating:
The possibility of an unintentional or intentional CODIS “hit” for Mitchell’s
biological relatives does not change our analysis. To begin with, Mitchell has
not shown that he has standing to assert the Fourth Amendment rights of his
relatives. Even if he did, the record does not contain any evidence of a
possible search or investigation of Mitchell’s relatives, and the claim is
entirely speculative. In this respect, we also find it significant that CODIS is
not designed for intentional familial searches and experts agree that searches
of that type would not produce any useful information.225
In Mitchell, the court was correct in holding that Mitchell did not have standing to
assert the Fourth Amendment rights of his relatives, as none of them were implicated
in the case. However, the court is incorrect in its finding that CODIS is not designed
for familial searches and that no useful information would not be produced from a
familial search. A familial search is effectuated through the normal use and design of
the CODIS system. The only difference between a normal DNA search and a familial
DNA search is that the law enforcement officer is looking for a hit that has some of
the sample DNA alleles in common,226 rather than a normal search where the law
enforcement officer looks for a sample where all of the alleles are in common.227 Other
than this minor difference, a familial search is conducted in the same manner as a
regular CODIS search. Because of the similarities between the searches, CODIS is
designed for familial searches and the court is incorrect in this finding.
Additionally, the court in Mitchell cites to a proposed rule by the Department of
Justice as the basis for its claim that CODIS is not designed for a familial search.228
The federal rule states: “The current design of the DNA identification system does not
encompass searches of this type against the national DNA index.”229 This statement
223 United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 409 n.19 (3d Cir. 2011).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 409 n.19 (alteration in original).
226 Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on
Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 18 (2010).
227 NIEDZWIECKI ET AL., supra note 90, at 2.
228 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 409 n.19 (citing DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence
Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74932, 74938 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28)).
229 DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence Preservation in the Federal
Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74932, 74938 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (emphasis
added).
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is accurate because familial DNA searches are not currently conducted in the national
CODIS database and are conducted only at the state and local levels.230 Thus, the rule
is not stating that the CODIS system is not equipped to run a familial search, it is
instead stating that the national database does not perform familial searches. The
CODIS system, therefore, is fully equipped to run a familial search, as it currently
does at the state and local levels.231 Since the court is referencing only a national
familial DNA search, which is not the search at issue, this finding by the Third Circuit
in Mitchell should be disregarded.
The court also stated that, had CODIS been equipped to conduct a familial search,
the familial searches would not produce any useful information.232 This is an
understatement by the court because familial DNA searches provide law enforcement
officers with one large piece of information - potential family members of a crime
suspect. By identifying relatives of an arrestee, law enforcement officers are able to
narrow their suspect pool at a faster rate.233 This gives law enforcement officers a
potential lead in an investigation that may have gone cold. It also saves time and
money because they are able to identify specific individuals to question.234 The
information that is derived from a familial search can completely shape a criminal
investigation because it provides officers with new information about a suspect that
they would not have been investigating. When properly conducted, familial DNA
searches have led to the identification and conviction of multiple suspects throughout
the country.235 Thus, familial searches do lead to useful pieces of information that have
a large impact on criminal investigations, and the contrary finding by Mitchell should
be disregarded.
Moreover, the information that is provided by familial DNA testing and the Third
Circuit’s rationale in Mitchell demonstrates the slippery slope that is created by
familial DNA testing. As previously stated, when Mitchell was decided in 2011, the
Third Circuit believed that no useful information could result from familial DNA

230 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 47, at 9.
231 Id.
232 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 409 n.19 (citing DNA-Sample Collection and Biological Evidence
Preservation in the Federal Jurisdiction, 73 Fed. Reg. 74932, 74938 (Dec. 10, 2008) (codified
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28)).
233 Robin Williams & Paul Johnson, Inclusiveness, Effectiveness and Intrusiveness: Issues
in the Developing Uses of DNA Profiling in Support of Criminal Investigations, 33 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 545, 546 (2005).
234 Id.
235 James Rainey, Familial DNA Puts Elusive Killers Behind Bars, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28,
2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/familial-dna-puts-elusive-killers-behind-barsonly-12-states-n869711 (using familial DNA to arrest murder suspect); Farnoush Amiri, An
Open-Source DNA Site Helped Lead to Mother’s Arrest in 1981 Death of Baby in Ditch, NBC
NEWS (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/investigators-used-opensource-dna-database-solve-1981-cold-case-n981776 (matching familial DNA to arrest mother
for murdering her child).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss1/10

28

2020]

NO LONGER INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY

213

testing.236 Now, only nine years later, it has been demonstrated that invading an
arrestee’s personal privacy through familial testing does produce useful information
for law enforcement.237 With rapid advancements in technology, it is important to
recognize that the use of arrestee DNA to aid in law enforcement investigations will
continue and increase the risk of a deeper invasion into the arrestee’s personal
privacy.238
Given that the Third Circuit in Mitchell relied on an improper analysis of the
implications of a familial DNA search of an arrestee’s DNA, the court’s analysis on
this issue should be disregarded when assessing the constitutionality of an arrestee
familial DNA search. Instead, a familial search is the type of “technological
advancement” that requires reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment analysis under
Mitchell.239 In that case, Mitchell argued that the scope of the information that can be
obtained from an arrestee’s DNA sample is extraordinarily broad.240 Further, with
technological advances, “junk DNA” could reveal more extensive information than is
presently disclosed.241 The court found that this possibility was “not unforeseeable.”242
The court relied upon the First Circuit’s analysis of this issue stating:
[S]cientific advances might make it possible to deduce information beyond
identity from the junk DNA that forms the thirteen-loci profiles stored in
CODIS. Future government uses of the DNA profiles in CODIS could
potentially reveal more intimate or private information about the profile’s
owner and depart from the uses for which the profiles were originally
lawfully created and retained. In this case, however, these are merely
hypothetical possibilities. . . As in Weikert, “the possibility that junk DNA
may not be junk DNA some day . . . does not significantly augment
[Borolan’s] privacy interest in the present case.243

236 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 409 n.19.
237 See supra notes 238–240.
238 See Thomas Brewster, Feds Force Suspect to Unlock an Apple iPhone X with Their Face,
FORBES (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/09/30/feds-forcesuspect-to-unlock-apple-iphone-x-with-their-face/#3f0914861259 (describing a situation
where a police officer forced a male in Columbus, Ohio, to unlock his iPhone through the use
of facial recognition).
239 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 408.
240 Id. at 407.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 408.
243 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 69 (1st Cir. 2010)).
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The court indicated that the hypothetical possibilities were unsupported in the case
and did not have substantial weight in the totality of the circumstances analysis.244
However, the court kept the door open to future advances by stating “[s]hould
technological advancements change the value of ‘junk DNA,’ reconsideration of our
Fourth Amendment analysis may be appropriate.”245
A familial search is exactly the “hypothetical possibility” that is referenced in
Mitchell. Forensic scientists examine junk DNA to create a DNA profile of an
arrestee.246 The original profile does not contain any genetic traits,247 instead it
contains a series of numbers which represent an analysis of specific locations on the
arrestee’s chromosome.248 However, as previously indicated, a familial search of junk
DNA does identify genetic traits of the arrestee because it links them to possible
relatives. This revelation of genetic traits changes the value of junk DNA, and
following the analysis of the Third Circuit in Mitchell, requires reconsideration of its
Fourth Amendment analysis.
C. Ohio’s Expungement Process Opens the Door to Familial DNA
Searches After Acquittal
Ohio’s practice of conducting familial DNA searches on arrestee DNA violates the
Fourth Amendment and the practice must be deemed unconstitutional by the Ohio
Supreme Court. If familial searches of arrestee DNA continue, the searches can
possibly expand past the time frame where individuals are simply arrestees waiting to
prove their case at trial, and can continue even after they have been found not guilty,
had their convictions overturned, or had charges against them dropped.
Specifically, Ohio’s DNA expungement process allows the state to continue
familial DNA searches even if an arrestee was found not guilty of any crimes.
Expungement is the process by which an individual’s DNA sample is removed from
CODIS,249 and under federal law all states that participate in CODIS are required to
establish DNA expungement provisions.250 42 U.S.C. § 14132(2)(A) requires a state

244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 OHIO CODIS OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at 26.
250 34 U.S.C. § 12592(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2017) (“As a condition of access to the index described
in subsection (a), a State shall promptly expunge from that index the DNA analysis of a person
included in the index by that State if – the person has not been convicted of an offense on the
basis of which that analysis was or could have been included in the index, and the responsible
agency or official of that State receives, for each charge against the person on the basis of which
the analysis was or could have been included in the index, a certified copy of a final court order
establishing that such charge has been dismissed or has resulted in an acquittal or that no charge
was filed within the applicable time period.”).
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to expunge an individual’s DNA from CODIS once the state receives a “certified copy
or final court order” establishing that a conviction was overturned, the defendant was
acquitted, or that no charge was filed within the applicable period.251 Although the law
provides these individuals with the opportunity to have their DNA expunged, the
reality is that very few profiles are actually removed.252 This is because the law is
open-ended and only provides mere guidelines that the states must include in their
expungement provisions rather than an established process for DNA expungement.253
Looking at 42 U.S.C. § 14132(2)(A) on its face, an individual could reasonably
assume that the process of submitting the certified copy or final order of the nonconviction would be automatically processed by the State upon non-conviction.
However, in Ohio the individual is burdened with initiating his or her own DNA
expungement process.254 Ohio’s lengthy DNA expungement process is outlined in the
Ohio Revised Code § 2953.52.255 Under this section, any person who is found not
guilty of an offense by a jury or court, who is a named defendant in a dismissed
complaint, indictment or information, or against whom a no bill is entered by a grand
jury may apply to the court for an order to seal his or her official records.256 After
receiving the application, the court sets a hearing on the application where it will
“weigh the interests of the person in having the official records pertaining to the case
sealed against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government to maintain those
records.”257 If the court finds that the record should be sealed, it will issue an order to
the superintendent of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation to seal the individuals
record and any DNA specimens, DNA records, and DNA profiles associated with the
case.258
The issues involved with Ohio’s DNA expungement process presents additional
concerns that in some ways outstrips the current issue. These issues are important to
discuss because the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation is given the authority to
run familial searches until it is ordered to remove the DNA from their CODIS
database.259 Tom Stickrath, former superintendent of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal

251 Id.
252 Elizabeth E. Joh, The Myth of Arrestee DNA Expungement, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE
51, 55 (2015).
253 34 U.S.C. § 12592(d)(2)(A)(ii).
254 Ohio Public Defenders Say That State Needs to Expunge DNA Samples of Innocent
People, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.innocenceproject.org/expunge-dnainnocent-ohio-people/; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52(B)(3) (2020).
255 § 2953.52.
256 Id. § 2953.52(A).
257 Id. § 2953.52(B)(2)(d).
258 Id. § 2953.52(B)(3).
259 See OHIO CODIS OPERATING PROCEDURES, supra note 63, at 27 (“For court orders
indicating a sample shall be expunged pursuant to 2953.52, the laboratory shall destroy the
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Investigation, has publicly stated that after the Bureau creates a DNA profile in CODIS
it does not track the legal outcome of the case.260 By not doing so, the Bureau relies
on the state to follow its process for DNA expungement and inform it when a DNA
profile is to be removed from CODIS. Ohio’s expungement process, however, is
flawed and creates additional issues that arrestees face when their DNA profile is
exposed to familial DNA searches.
First, by placing the burden of initiating the expungement process upon the
individual, Ohio receives the benefit of increasing its CODIS databank by exploiting
individuals who are unaware of the DNA expungement process or lack the resources
to pursue the process on their own.261 This effect was demonstrated in a 2012 study of
states with DNA expungement laws that are identical to Ohio which showed that
“when individuals bear the burden of initiating the expungement process, very few
expungements actually occur and profiles are retained of individuals who were never
formally charged with a qualifying offense or whose case resulted in acquittal or
dismissal.”262
The lack of expungements that actually occur suggests that not only does Ohio
conduct familial DNA searches of arrestees who have not yet gone to court, Ohio also
conducts familial DNA searches of individuals who have been wrongly arrested and
have not been found guilty of any criminal activity. The large amount of former
arrestee DNA that remains to be searched in CODIS is a gross deviation from the
original intent of the courts in both Maryland and Mitchell when they first legalized
arrestee DNA collection.263 Both courts authorized arrestee DNA collection for the
purpose of facilitating the need of law enforcement officers to identify persons taken
into custody in safe and accurate way.264 Ohio has since expanded arrestee DNA
collection past its original purpose and continually uses it to affect an individual after
he has officially been deemed not guilty by subjecting him and his family members to
familial DNA searches. This is a substantial step away from the original intent behind
arrestee DNA collection, and Ohio’s DNA expungement process illustrates the further
implications and searches that can arise from unconstitutional familial searches of
arrestee DNA.
Second, even if an individual does apply for DNA expungement, his or her DNA
profile is exposed to normal and familial DNA searches for an extensive period of
time before the profile is actually expunged. As previously shown, DNA expungement
involves a lengthy process that involves several steps and actions by multiple persons

physical sample and delete the DNA profile from the software. The offender’s DNA Collection
Form and the CODNA information shall be removed.”).
260 Rebecca Beitsch, DNA Upon Arrest: Solving Cold Cases or Presuming Guilt?, PEW (Jan.
12,
2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2017/01/12/dna-upon-arrest-solving-cold-cases-or-presuming-guilt.
261 Joh, supra note 252, at 58.
262 Julie Samuels et al., Collecting DNA from Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, 270 NAT’L
INST. JUST. J. 18, 23 (2012).
263 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013).
264 See id.
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before a DNA profile is officially removed from CODIS.265 The Ohio Revised Code
does not include a time frame in which the process must be completed.266 This allows
the State to drag out the process and continue conducting normal and familial searches
of the former arrestee’s DNA profile for as long as it chooses. These issues, therefore,
demonstrate the further implications that will occur if Ohio continues to violate the
Fourth Amendment and conduct familial DNA searches of arrestee DNA.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Leon Edwards was acquitted of all criminal activity, the residue of his
arrest remained in Ohio’s CODIS database for over a year and potentially still remains
there today. Ohio unconstitutionally subjected Edwards and his family to familial
DNA searches and continues to violate the Fourth Amendment rights of felonyarrestees today.
The practice of conducting familial DNA searches is currently expanding into
more states. With this expansion brings the implication that arrestees all around the
country will be subject to unconstitutional DNA searches without, if ever, being
convicted of a crime. These searches are unconstitutional and are a violation of
arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Arrestees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that is obtained
from their DNA profile in a familial DNA search, and the government is using that
information to link their blood relatives to unsolved crimes. This type of fishing for
evidence of crime goes beyond all governmental interests in collecting arrestee DNA
and goes against the intention of the Supreme Court when it specifically precluded the
use of arrestee DNA in familial DNA searches. Further, Ohio’s DNA expungement
procedures provide the possibility that arrestee DNA may never be removed from
CODIS, which would subject arrestees to familial DNA searches in perpetuity, even
after non-conviction. Ohio must amend its familial DNA search protocol to exclude
DNA from felony arrestees. If it does not, all arrestees face the possibility of limitless,
unconstitutional searches for the rest of their lives regardless of the outcome of their
case.

265 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.52 (2012).
266 § 2953.52.
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